報告人：深圳大學(xué) 助理教授弋澤龍
時間：2019年2月22日（周五）14:00
地點(diǎn)：主樓317室
報告內(nèi)容摘要：
We investigate how a firm selling a newly developed digital product is affected by piracy in terms of pricing, quality disclosure strategy and profitability. We consider a monopolistic digital-good firm and the quality information of its product is unknown to prospective customers. The firm can choose to disclose the quality information at a nonzero fixed cost to resolve the quality uncertainty confronting consumers. We unexpectedly find that, in equilibrium, the firm's profit may strictly decrease with the difficulty or cost of pirating when the true product quality is not too high such that the firm will choose not to disclose quality information. This is because, with higher piracy cost, the firm has more incentives to disclose the quality and, as a result, rational customers' quality belief conditional on nondisclosure is lower, which leads to a lower profit the firm can obtain. We further extend our model in several aspects. Related managerial implications are discussed.
報告人簡介:
弋澤龍，深圳大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院交通經(jīng)濟(jì)與物流管理系助理教授，博士畢業(yè)于香港科技大學(xué)商學(xué)院運(yùn)營管理方向，主要從事消費(fèi)者行為、供應(yīng)鏈管理、信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等相關(guān)研究工作。已經(jīng)在Production and Operations Management、Decision Sciences、OMEGA、Information and Management等期刊發(fā)表論文，主持國家自然科學(xué)基金和廣東省自然科學(xué)基金等科研項(xiàng)目，多次擔(dān)任Manufacturing & Service Operations Management、Production and Operations Management、OMEGA、International Journal of Production Economics等期刊匿名審稿人。
（承辦：技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)及戰(zhàn)略管理系、科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
