時間：12月29日（星期二）上午9:00-10:30
會議號：騰訊會議209 499 242
報告人簡介：
Hsing Kenneth Cheng教授是佛羅里達大學John B. Higdon杰出學者、Warrington商學院信息系統(tǒng)和運營管理系系主任。他于1992年獲得羅徹斯特大學計算機與信息系統(tǒng)博士學位。鄭教授的主要研究方向為互聯(lián)網(wǎng)技術對軟件開發(fā)和市場營銷的影響分析、信息系統(tǒng)政策問題（特別是關于網(wǎng)絡中立性的全國辯論）。基于在前三名信息系統(tǒng)期刊上發(fā)表的論文，鄭教授在全球信息系統(tǒng)100名研究人員中排名第20位(2009-2011年)和第16位(2010-2012年)。鄭教授目前任Decision Sciences副主編， Journal of the Association for Information Systems、Information Systems and electronic Management高級編輯。2011-2014年擔任Information Systems Research副主編，曾任職于許多信息系統(tǒng)會議和研討會的項目委員會，并擔任Workshop on E-Business (2003年，2012年)和Taiwan Summer Workshop on Information Management項目聯(lián)合主席。
報告內(nèi)容簡介：
Sales on the e-commerce platform in the United States have experienced explosive growth and are projected to surpass 740 billion in 2023. The expansion of the platform's traditional role as a platform into an online marketplace and the introduction of its own brand products have stoked a huge fear among the incumbent sellers. The platform's unfair anti- competitive practice further aggravates the situation. Consequently, politicians and regulators have proposed prohibiting platforms from introducing own brand product in order to protect the incumbent sellers. This study addresses two research questions of critical interest to both the policy makers and the incumbent sellers. First, is the platform's introducing its own brand product always detrimental to the incumbent sellers? Second, how effective is the proposed policy in terms of protecting the incumbent sellers? We examine the impact of the platform's own brand introduction on the incumbent sellers under two prevailing sell-on and sell-to pricing contracts. We find that the proposed legislation “that prohibits platforms from both offering a marketplace for commerce and participating in that marketplace” does not have the desired outcome of helping the incumbent sellers. Instead, it forces the platform to adopt only the sell-to contract with own brand introduction that always hurts the sellers. Interestingly, when the own brand introduction is banned under the sell-to contract, the incumbent sellers can be better off because the platform's strategic reaction to the enforcement can lead to the best scenario for the incumbent sellers. If the ban is imposed on both the sell-on and sell-to contracts, the platform's best response is to add another new brand competing with the incumbent sellers, which can also help the incumbent sellers, however, not as much as in the case of the enforcement only under the sell-to contract.
（承辦：管理工程系、科研與學術交流中心）
