時(shí)間：4月7日（星期四）下午2:30-4:00
騰訊會(huì)議號(hào)：751465222
報(bào)告人：中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)趙健宇助理教授
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
趙健宇，中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院助理教授，北京大學(xué)光華偉德國(guó)際1946bv官網(wǎng)博士，研究方向?yàn)樾畔⑴?、稅收政策、公司?cái)務(wù)與勞動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)交叉研究。學(xué)術(shù)成果發(fā)表于《經(jīng)濟(jì)研究》、《管理世界》、《南開(kāi)管理評(píng)論》、《會(huì)計(jì)研究》、《金融研究》、Journal of Management Accounting Research等國(guó)內(nèi)外一流期刊。擔(dān)任《經(jīng)濟(jì)研究》、《財(cái)貿(mào)經(jīng)濟(jì)》、《財(cái)務(wù)研究》、China Finance Review International匿名審稿人。報(bào)告內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介：
We examine whether and how bank interventions affect workplace safety through debt covenant violations. Debt covenant violations allocate control rights to creditors, allowing banks to intervene with corporate policies and decisions. By conducting a regression discontinuity design, we find that bank interventions significantly reduce workplace injuries and improve workplace safety. The effect is more pronounced when firms have limited inputs into safety and burdened workload before the violations, when firms have powerful labor unions, when firms are financially constrained, or when the bank intervention is from relationship banks. Our findings provide strong evidence that creditors play a role in shaping workplace safety and improving overall employee welfare.
（承辦：會(huì)計(jì)系、科研與學(xué)術(shù)交流中心）
